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This paper addresses questions of the following nature: under what conditions
does a welfare-improving reform of a nonlinear income tax system necessitate a
change in a particular agent￿ s marginal tax rate or total tax burden? Our analysis
is therefore a study in tax reform, rather than in optimal taxation. We consider
a simple model with three types of agents (high-skill, middle-skill, and low-skill)
who have preferences that are quasi-linear in labour. Under these assumptions
and using our methodology, speci￿c characteristics of the initial suboptimal tax
system can be determined when all welfare-improving tax reforms require speci￿ed
changes in a particular agent￿ s tax treatment. Some other necessary features of
the tax reform can also be determined. Thus, unlike many tax reform analyses in
the literature, we are able to reach a number of clear-cut conclusions.
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The aim of the optimal taxation literature is to determine the features of an optimal
tax system. However, there are some long-standing criticisms of this approach to nor-
mative tax theory. In particular, the optimal tax approach implicitly assumes that the
government is free to choose all taxes, and that it is willing and able to implement the
possibly large changes in taxes required to reach an optimum.1 The characteristics of
the status quo tax system are irrelevant under the optimal tax approach. In practice,
however, the government must take the existing tax system as its starting point, and
actual changes in taxes tend to be ￿slow and piecemeal￿(Feldstein [1976]). Such obser-
vations motivate the tax reform approach, pioneered by Guesnerie [1977]. Tax reform
analysis takes the existing tax system as given, and then examines the conditions un-
der which there exist small (modelled as di⁄erential) changes in taxes that are feasible
(equilibrium-preserving) and desirable (welfare-improving).2 The tax reform approach
therefore comes closer to capturing the actual behaviour of governments.
If one ￿nds the preceding arguments reasonable, the question arises as to why the
optimal tax approach continues to dominate the literature, while tax reform papers are
few and far between. At ￿rst thought, one may think that the tax reform approach is
in some sense redundant￿ once the characteristics of the optimal tax system have been
determined, the government should simply change taxes toward their optimal levels.
However, it has been known for some time that changes ￿in the right direction, but stop
short of attaining the full optimum, can actually reduce welfare￿(Dixit [1975]). Indeed,
Guesnerie￿ s [1977] temporary ine¢ ciency result shows that an equilibrium-preserving
and Pareto-improving policy reform may require a move from a production e¢ cient
allocation to a production ine¢ cient allocation, even though production e¢ ciency is
desirable at an optimum (Diamond and Mirrlees [1971]). In our opinion, the reason that
the tax reform approach remains relatively neglected is because it is generally di¢ cult
1For example, two well-known results in the optimal tax literature are that capital should not
be taxed and that the highest-skilled workers should face a zero marginal tax rate on their labour
income. These recommendations stand in stark contrast to the features of real-world tax systems, and
implementing them would involve a major shock to the economy.
2For an excellent textbook treatment of the tax reform approach, see chapter 6 in Myles [1995].
2to obtain clear-cut results. For example, the main result of Guesnerie [1977, Proposition
4] on the existence of equilibrium-preserving and Pareto-improving policy reforms is
very technical, relating the position of a vector representing the equilibrium conditions
to a cone representing Pareto improvements.3 Diewert [1978] and Weymark [1979] use
di⁄erent mathematical techniques to Guesnerie,4 but their results also tend to be quite
technical. For the most part, the results of Guesnerie, Diewert, and Weymark can be
interpreted as providing empirically-testable formulae for the existence or otherwise of
feasible and desirable tax reforms, rather than providing a simple description of optimal
and suboptimal tax systems. Other tax reform analyses, such as those by Hatta [1977],
Konishi [1995], Brett [1998], Murty and Russell [2005], Krause [2007], and Duclos, et al.
[2008], also tend to yield technical results that do not have a straightforward economic
interpretation.5
The aim of this paper is to undertake a tax reform analysis, but using a model and
methodology that lead to clear-cut results. We use the nonlinear income tax model of
Mirrlees [1971],6 albeit with just three types of agents, and we assume that the utility
function is quasi-linear in labour. We think the assumption that there are only three
types of agents is not too restrictive, since real-world income tax systems tend to be
designed broadly around how low-income, middle-income, and high-income individuals
should be taxed. The assumption that preferences are quasi-linear is much more trou-
bling, but quasi-linearity seems necessary to obtain detailed and clear results.7 On the
methodological side, we analyse tax reforms of a speci￿c nature. That is, we examine
3See also chapter 3 in Guesnerie [1995].
4In particular, they use Motzkin￿ s Theorem of the Alternative to analyse tax reforms, as we do in
this paper.
5Tax reform techniques have also been used to revisit speci￿c issues in optimal taxation, and in this
case some clear conclusions can be reached. For example, Blackorby and Brett [2000] use tax reform
techniques to examine the Diamond-Mirrlees production e¢ ciency theorem. Fleurbaey [2006] takes a
tax reform approach to examine the desirability of consumption taxation versus income taxation, while
Krause [2009] undertakes a tax reform analysis of the La⁄er argument.
6It should be noted that most of the tax reform literature examines linear commodity taxation rather
than nonlinear income taxation, although Konishi [1995] is an exception. He examines a model with
linear commodity taxation and nonlinear income taxation.
7This is partly because some of our results make use of comparative statics methods, which require
the assumption of quasi-linear utility. The literature which examines the comparative statics of optimal
nonlinear income taxes also assumes quasi-linearity. See for example Hamilton and Pestieau [2005],
Simula [2010], and Brett and Weymark [2011].
3the conditions under which a feasible welfare-improving tax reform requires a change
in a particular agent￿ s marginal tax rate or total tax burden. While this approach is
less general than that typically taken in the tax reform literature, it does have a real-
world counterpart. For example, in the U.K. recently there has been much discussion
over whether the top marginal income tax rate should be reduced. In our model, this
corresponds to asking under what conditions does an equilibrium-preserving and welfare-
improving tax reform require a reduction in the marginal tax rate faced by high-skill
individuals. Our answer, given in further detail in part (a) of Proposition 2, is that the
marginal tax rates faced by low-skill and middle-skill individuals must already be opti-
mal, but they must be paying too much tax under the current (suboptimal) tax system.
Also, the marginal tax rate faced by high-skill individuals must be too high, and their
tax payments too low, relative to their optimal levels. As can be seen, we are able to
provide a relatively simple and clear description of the initial suboptimal tax system
when such a tax reform is required. Some other features of the tax reform necessary to
move towards optimality can also be determined.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model
we use, and de￿nes what we mean by equilibrium-preserving and welfare-improving tax
reforms. Section 3 examines the conditions under which all equilibrium-preserving and
welfare-improving tax reforms require a change in a particular agent￿ s marginal tax
rate, while Section 4 examines the conditions under which all equilibrium-preserving
and welfare-improving tax reforms require a change in a particular agent￿ s total tax
payments. Section 5 concludes, proofs and some other mathematical details are relegated
to Appendix A, and numerical examples of our results are provided in Appendix B.
2 The Model
There are three types of individual, and individuals are distinguished by their skill levels
in employment or, equivalently, their wage rates. Type i￿ s wage is denoted by wi, where
w3 > w2 > w1 so that type 3 individuals are high-skill, type 2 individuals are middle-
skill, and type 1 individuals are low-skill. We make the standard assumption that the
4economy￿ s technology is linear, which implies that wages are ￿xed. Individuals have the
same preferences, which are representable by the quasi-linear utility function:
u(xi) ￿ ￿li (2.1)
where xi is type i￿ s consumption and li is type i￿ s labour supply. The function u(￿) is
increasing and strictly concave, while ￿ > 0 is a preference parameter that captures the




ni [u(xi) ￿ ￿li] (2.2)
where ni represents the population of type i individuals.
The government imposes nonlinear taxation on labour income, where yi = wili de-
notes the pre-tax income of a type i individual.8 Formally, we associate a nonlinear
income tax schedule with three tax contracts: hy1;x1i, hy2;x2i, and hy3;x3i. Therefore,
yi ￿ xi is taxes paid (or, if negative, transfers received) by a type i individual.
An equilibrium of our model is obtained if and only if:
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where G is the government￿ s exogenously determined revenue requirement. Equation
(2.3) is the government￿ s budget constraint, while equations (2.4) and (2.5) are incentive-
compatibility constraints associated with nonlinear income taxation. We analyse what
Stiglitz [1982] calls the ￿normal￿case and what Guesnerie [1995] calls ￿redistributive
equilibria￿ , in that the incentive-compatibility constraints may bind ￿downwards￿but
never ￿upwards￿ . This is consistent with redistributive taxation, which creates an incen-
8As in Mirrlees [1971], it is assumed that the government cannot observe an individual￿ s skill type,
and therefore it cannot implement (the ￿rst-best) personalised lump-sum taxes.
5tive for higher-skill individuals to mimic lower-skill individuals, but not vice versa. Built
into equations (2.4) and (2.5) is the simplifying assumption that only the downward-
adjacent incentive-compatibility constraints may bind, i.e., low-skill and high-skill in-
dividuals are not directly linked through the incentive-compatibility constraints. For
analytical purposes, we assume that the status quo equilibrium is ￿tight￿ , i.e., equations
(2:3)￿(2:5) all hold with equality. This assumption allows us to di⁄erentiate the system
of equations (2:3)￿(2:5). We also assume that each type of individual has positive levels
of consumption and labour in the initial equilibrium.
We de￿ne a tax reform as the vector dR := hdy1, dx1, dy2, dx2, dy3, dx3i, which
can be interpreted as the government implementing a small change in the nonlinear
income tax system. Starting in an initial tight equilibrium, a tax reform is said to be
equilibrium-preserving if and only if:
rZdR ￿ 0
(3) (2.6)
where rZ is the Jacobian matrix (with respect to dR) associated with equations (2:3)￿
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where all derivatives are evaluated in the status quo equilibrium. An equilibrium-
preserving tax reform is a tax reform that moves the economy to a neighbouring equi-
librium.
A tax reform is said to be welfare-improving if and only if:
rWdR > 0 (2.8)






w3, n3u0(x3)i is the gradient (with
respect to dR) of the utilitarian social welfare function. A welfare-improving tax reform
6is a tax reform that increases social welfare.
3 Reforming Marginal Tax Rates
It is shown in Appendix A that the marginal tax rate applicable to the income of type
i individuals can be written as:











dMTRi = ￿dxi (3.2)
It follows that dMTRi T 0 if and only if rMidR T 0, where rM1 := h0, ￿1, 0(4)i,
rM2 := h0(3), ￿1, 0(2)i, and rM3 := h0(5), ￿1i.




rWdR > 0 (3.4)
rMidR ￿ 0 (3.5)
then there are two possibilities: (i) There does not exist a tax reform that satis￿es
equations (3.3) and (3.4). In this case, there do not exist any equilibrium-preserving
and welfare-improving tax reforms, so the status quo tax system is already optimal
and equation (3.5) is redundant. (ii) There do exist tax reforms that satisfy equations
(3.3) and (3.4), but all such reforms violate equation (3.5). In this case, the status quo
tax system is suboptimal, and any move towards optimality requires an increase in the
marginal tax rate faced by type i individuals (i.e., a violation of equation (3.5)). As we
are interested in examining moves from a suboptimal towards an optimal tax system,
we focus on this second possibility.
7By Motzkin￿ s Theorem of the Alternative,9 if there does not exist a tax reform dR
that satis￿es equations (3:3) ￿ (3:5), then there exist real numbers h￿1;￿2;￿3i ￿ 0(3),
￿4 > 0, and ￿5 ￿ 0 such that:10
h￿1;￿2;￿3irZ + ￿4rW ￿ ￿5rMi = 0
(6) (3.6)
The system of equations (3.6) characterises what the initial suboptimal tax system ￿looks
like￿when all equilibrium-preserving and welfare-improving tax reforms require an in-
crease in the marginal tax rate faced by type i individuals.
Let z denote the level of variable z when the tax system is optimal, and let Ti denote
type i￿ s tax payments. Using equation (3.6) we obtain the following proposition (all
proofs are provided in Appendix A):
Proposition 1: Consider an initial tight equilibrium of our model in which the nonlinear
income tax system is suboptimal:
(a) If all equilibrium-preserving and welfare-improving tax reforms require an increase
in the marginal tax rate faced by high-skill (type 3) individuals, then: (i) in the initial
equilibrium MTR1 = MTR1, MTR2 = MTR2, MTR3 < MTR3, T1 > T 1, T2 > T 2,
and T3 < T 3, and (ii) the move towards the optimal tax system requires dx1 = 0,
dy1 < 0, dx2 = 0, dy2 < 0, dx3 < 0, and dy3 < 0.
(b) If all equilibrium-preserving and welfare-improving tax reforms require an increase
in the marginal tax rate faced by middle-skill (type 2) individuals, then: (i) in the initial
equilibrium MTR1 = MTR1, MTR2 < MTR2, and MTR3 = MTR3, and (ii) the
move towards the optimal tax system requires dx1 = 0, dx2 < 0, dy2 < 0, and dx3 = 0.
(c) If all equilibrium-preserving and welfare-improving tax reforms require an increase
in the marginal tax rate faced by low-skill (type 1) individuals, then: (i) in the initial
equilibrium MTR1 < MTR1, MTR2 = MTR2, and MTR3 = MTR3, and (ii) the
move towards the optimal tax system requires dx1 < 0, dy1 < 0, dx2 = 0, and dx3 = 0.
By reversing the inequality in equation (3.5), one can examine the conditions under
9A statement of Motzkin￿ s Theorem is provided in Appendix A.
10Vector notation: z ￿ e z () zj ￿ e zj 8 j, z > e z () zj ￿ e zj 8 j ^ z 6= e z, z ￿ e z () zj > e zj 8 j.
8which all equilibrium-preserving and welfare-improving tax reforms require a decrease
in the marginal tax rate applicable to type i individuals. This leads to:
Proposition 2: Consider an initial tight equilibrium of our model in which the nonlinear
income tax system is suboptimal:
(a) If all equilibrium-preserving and welfare-improving tax reforms require a decrease
in the marginal tax rate faced by high-skill (type 3) individuals, then: (i) in the initial
equilibrium MTR1 = MTR1, MTR2 = MTR2, MTR3 > MTR3, T1 > T 1, T2 > T 2,
and T3 < T 3, and (ii) the move towards the optimal tax system requires dx1 = 0,
dy1 < 0, dx2 = 0, dy2 < 0, dx3 > 0, and dy3 > 0.
(b) If all equilibrium-preserving and welfare-improving tax reforms require a decrease in
the marginal tax rate faced by middle-skill (type 2) individuals, then: (i) in the initial
equilibrium MTR1 = MTR1, MTR2 > MTR2, MTR3 = MTR3, and T3 > T 3, and (ii)
the move towards the optimal tax system requires dx1 = 0, dx2 > 0, dy2 > 0, dx3 = 0,
and dy3 < 0.
(c) If all equilibrium-preserving and welfare-improving tax reforms require a decrease
in the marginal tax rate faced by low-skill (type 1) individuals, then: (i) in the initial
equilibrium MTR1 > MTR1, MTR2 = MTR2, MTR3 = MTR3, T1 < T 1, T2 > T 2,
and T3 > T 3, and (ii) the move towards the optimal tax system requires dx1 > 0,
dy1 > 0, dx2 = 0, dy2 < 0, dx3 = 0, and dy3 < 0.
It can be seen from Propositions 1 and 2 that the results for tax reforms requiring an
increase or decrease in type i￿ s marginal tax rate are not simply mirror images of one an-
other. If all equilibrium-preserving and welfare-improving tax reforms require a change
(increase or decrease) in type i￿ s marginal tax rate, then the tax reform must include a
change in xi (cf. equation (3.2)). As the status quo equilibrium is assumed to be tight,
one can solve equations (2:3)￿(2:5) and obtain the functions y1(x1;x2;x3), y2(x1;x2;x3),
and y3(x1;x2;x3). In general, the signs of the comparative statics, @yj(￿)=@xi, are am-
biguous. However, one can use the system of equations (3.6) (or the analogous system
for the case of decreasing type i￿ s marginal tax rate) to sign at least some of these com-
parative statics. As the sign of @yj(￿)=@xi may depend upon whether the tax reform
requires an increase or decrease in type i￿ s marginal tax rate, Propositions 1 and 2 are
9not simply mirror images of each other.
If all equilibrium-preserving and welfare-improving tax reforms require a change in
type i￿ s marginal tax rate, then xi 6= xi but xj = xj (for all j 6= i). This follows
from solving the system of equations (3.6) (or the analogous system for the case of
decreasing type i￿ s marginal tax rate) for x1, x2, and x3. Therefore, MTRi 6= MTRi
and MTRj = MTRj (for all j 6= i) in all parts of Propositions 1 and 2. Correspondingly,
the tax reform required to move towards optimality must include a change in xi, but no
change in xj (for all j 6= i).
The other features of Propositions 1 and 2 follow from the comparative statics,
@yj(￿)=@xi. For part (a) of Proposition 1 we have @y1(￿)=@x3 > 0 and @y2(￿)=@x3 > 0.
As the tax reform requires dx3 < 0, we must have dy1 < 0 and dy2 < 0. Moreover,
since dx1 = dx2 = 0, the tax reform reduces tax payments by low-skill and middle-
skill individuals, implying that they must have been paying too much tax in the initial
equilibrium (T1 > T 1 and T2 > T 2). This in turn implies that high-skill individuals must
have been paying too little tax in the initial equilibrium (T3 < T 3). Analogously, for
part (a) of Proposition 2 we have @y1(￿)=@x3 < 0 and @y2(￿)=@x3 < 0. As the tax reform
in this case requires dx3 > 0, we must have dy1 < 0 and dy2 < 0. And since dx1 =
dx2 = 0, the tax reform reduces tax payments by low-skill and middle-skill individuals.
This again implies that they were paying too much tax in the initial equilibrium, while
high-skill individuals were paying too little. Taken together, part (a) of Propositions 1
and 2 show that if the high-skill type￿ s marginal tax rate is not optimal and must be
changed, then they are paying less tax than is optimal. As is well known, it is optimal
for the high-skill type to face a zero marginal tax rate, at which point their tax payments
are maximised for a given level of utility. The intuition behind part (a) of Propositions
1 and 2 follows from this well-known result.
Unfortunately, less can be said about parts (b) and (c) of Propositions 1 and 2, be-
cause most of the comparative statics, @yj(￿)=@xi, cannot be signed. The only exception
is part (c) of Proposition 2, in which the full set of comparative statics is determinate
and therefore a relatively complete description of the initial suboptimal tax system and
the tax reform required is possible. In this case, which deals with when a decrease in
10the low-skill type￿ s marginal tax rate is required, tax payments by low-skill individuals
in the initial equilibrium are lower than optimal and, correspondingly, tax payments by
middle-skill and high-skill individuals are higher than optimal. The intuition is that
the higher-than-optimal marginal tax rate faced by low-skill individuals distorts their
labour supply downwards too much, so they earn too little income and pay too little
in taxes. Accordingly, a welfare-improving tax reform requires that low-skill individu-
als work longer and pay more in taxes, while taxes paid by middle-skill and high-skill
individuals are correspondingly reduced.
4 Reforming Total Tax Payments
Tax paid by a type i individual is equal to Ti = yi ￿xi. Therefore, dTi = dyi ￿ dxi and
dTi T 0 if and only if rTidR T 0, where rT1 := h1, ￿1, 0(4)i, rT2 := h0(2), 1, ￿1, 0(2)i,
and rT3 := h0(4), 1, ￿1i.
One can analyse situations in which all equilibrium-preserving and welfare-improving
tax reforms require a change in type i￿ s tax payments in a similar manner as above for
marginal tax rates. Starting in an initial tight equilibrium, if there does not exist a tax
reform dR such that:
rZdR ￿ 0
(3) (4.1)
rWdR > 0 (4.2)
rTidR ￿ 0 (4.3)
then all equilibrium-preserving and welfare-improving tax reforms require an increase
in tax paid by type i individuals (i.e., a violation of equation (4.3) is required). By
applying Motzkin￿ s Theorem of the Alternative, if there does not exist a tax reform that
satis￿es equations (4:1) ￿ (4:3), then there exist h￿1;￿2;￿3i ￿ 0(3), ￿4 > 0, and ￿5 ￿ 0
such that:
h￿1;￿2;￿3irZ + ￿4rW ￿ ￿5rTi = 0
(6) (4.4)
Using the system of equations (4.4) we obtain:
11Proposition 3: Consider an initial tight equilibrium of our model in which the nonlinear
income tax system is suboptimal:
(a) If all equilibrium-preserving and welfare-improving tax reforms require an increase
in the tax paid by high-skill (type 3) individuals, then: (i) in the initial equilibrium
MTR1 < MTR1, MTR2 < MTR2, MTR3 = MTR3, T1 + T2 > T 1 + T 2, and T3 < T 3,
and (ii) the move towards the optimal tax system requires dx1 < 0, dx2 < 0, dx3 = 0,
dy3 > 0, and dy1 < 0 and/or dy2 < 0.
(b) If all equilibrium-preserving and welfare-improving tax reforms require an increase
in the tax paid by middle-skill (type 2) individuals, then: (i) in the initial equilibrium
MTR1 < MTR1, MTR2 > MTR2, MTR3 = MTR3, T1 + T3 > T 1 + T 3, and T2 < T 2,
and (ii) the move towards the optimal tax system requires dx1 < 0, dx2 > 0, dy2 > 0,
dx3 = 0, and dy1 < 0 and/or dy3 < 0.
(c) If all equilibrium-preserving and welfare-improving tax reforms require an increase
in the tax paid by low-skill (type 1) individuals, then: (i) in the initial equilibrium
MTR1 > MTR1, MTR2 > MTR2, MTR3 = MTR3, T2 + T3 > T 2 + T 3, and T1 < T 1,
and (ii) the move towards the optimal tax system requires dx1 > 0, dy1 > 0, dx2 > 0,
and dx3 = 0.
By reversing the inequality in equation (4.3), we obtain the results for necessitated
decreases in tax payments:
Proposition 4: Consider an initial tight equilibrium of our model in which the nonlinear
income tax system is suboptimal:
(a) If all equilibrium-preserving and welfare-improving tax reforms require a decrease
in the tax paid by high-skill (type 3) individuals, then: (i) in the initial equilibrium
MTR1 > MTR1, MTR2 > MTR2, MTR3 = MTR3, T1 + T2 < T 1 + T 2, and T3 > T 3,
and (ii) the move towards the optimal tax system requires dx1 > 0, dx2 > 0, dx3 = 0,
dy3 < 0, and dy1 > 0 and/or dy2 > 0.
(b) If all equilibrium-preserving and welfare-improving tax reforms require a decrease
in the tax paid by middle-skill (type 2) individuals, then: (i) in the initial equilibrium
MTR1 > MTR1, MTR2 < MTR2, MTR3 = MTR3, T1 + T3 < T 1 + T 3, and T2 > T 2,
and (ii) the move towards the optimal tax system requires dx1 > 0, dx2 < 0, dy2 < 0,
12dx3 = 0, and dy1 > 0 and/or dy3 > 0.
(c) If all equilibrium-preserving and welfare-improving tax reforms require a decrease
in the tax paid by low-skill (type 1) individuals, then: (i) in the initial equilibrium
MTR1 < MTR1, MTR2 < MTR2, MTR3 = MTR3, T2 + T3 < T 2 + T 3, and T1 > T 1,
and (ii) the move towards the optimal tax system requires dx1 < 0, dy1 < 0, dx2 < 0,
and dx3 = 0.
Unlike the results for reforming marginal tax rates, the results obtained for tax re-
forms requiring an increase or decrease in type i￿ s tax payments, as stated in Propositions
3 and 4, are simply mirror images of each other. These results follow from the system
of equations (4:4) (or the analogous system for a decrease in type i￿ s tax payments),
rather than from the comparative statics, @yj(￿)=@xi. Since Ti = yi ￿ xi, type i￿ s tax
payments can be changed without necessarily changing xi. Thus the comparative sta-
tics, @yj(￿)=@xi, cannot help shed light on the characteristics of the initial suboptimal
tax system, nor of the tax reform required to move towards optimality. This means
that, in general, less can be said about tax reforms requiring a change in an agent￿ s
tax payments than in their marginal tax rate. Furthermore, those results that can be
obtained for necessitated increases and decreases in type i￿ s tax payments are simply
mirror images of one another.
Part (a) of Proposition 3 is the case when all equilibrium-preserving and welfare-
improving tax reforms require an increase in tax paid by high-skill individuals. In this
case, rTi = rT3 in the system of equations (4.4), and these equations can be solved
for x1, x2, and x3. It can then be shown that x1 > x1, x2 > x2, and x3 = x3, which
implies that MTR1 < MTR1, MTR2 < MTR2, and MTR3 = MTR3. To move towards
optimality, the tax reform therefore requires dx1 < 0, dx2 < 0, and no change in x3. As
tax payments by high-skill individuals must be increased, T3 < T 3 and, correspondingly,
T1 +T2 > T 1 +T 2 in the initial equilibrium. Therefore, the tax reform requires dy3 > 0,
and dy1 < 0 and/or dy2 < 0 is also required to reduce aggregate tax payments by
low-skill and middle-skill individuals. Finally, parts (b) and (c) of Proposition 3 can
be interpreted in a similar manner to part (a), and as discussed earlier Proposition 4 is
simply the reverse of Proposition 3.
135 Conclusion
We have analysed nonlinear income tax reforms using a model and methodology that
lead to a relatively clear description of the initial suboptimal tax system and the tax
reform required to move towards optimality. Furthermore, the types of tax reform
questions addressed correspond quite closely to those actually faced by policy-makers,
which typically revolve around whether a speci￿c piecemeal reform￿ such as reducing the
top marginal tax rate￿ should be implemented. The price paid for the clarity achieved in
this paper is that we have used a simple model, and we have assumed that preferences
are quasi-linear. That said, our model is a low-dimensional (three-type) version of
the workhorse Mirrlees [1971] nonlinear income tax model, and the assumption that
preferences are quasi-linear is not uncommon.
The existing tax reform literature typically yields results that are quite technical,
and that are lacking in economic intuition. We have been able to obtain a number of
clear-cut results, but it remains di¢ cult to provide a simple economic explanation for
many of our results. This may suggest that these results are heavily dependent upon the
quasi-linearity assumption. In future work, it would be worth exploring the possibility of
generalising the model and the utility function. We expect that such generalisations will
make it more di¢ cult to obtain clear-cut results, but those results that can be obtained
are likely to have a fairly straightforward economic intuition.
6 Appendix A
Deriving the Expression for the Marginal Tax Rate
To derive equation (3.1), suppose the individuals faced a smooth nonlinear income tax
function T(yi). Each individual i would solve the following programme:
max
xi, li
fu(xi) ￿ ￿li j xi ￿ yi ￿ T(yi)g (A.1)
14The relevant ￿rst-order conditions corresponding to this programme are:
u
0(xi) ￿ ￿ = 0 (A.2)
￿￿ + ￿wi [1 ￿ T
0(yi)] = 0 (A.3)
where ￿ > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier, and T 0(yi) can be interpreted as individual i￿ s
marginal tax rate. Straightforward manipulation of equations (A.2) and (A.3) leads to
equation (3.1). ￿
Motzkin￿ s Theorem of the Alternative
Let A, C, and D be a1 ￿ m, a2 ￿ m, and a3 ￿ m matrices, respectively, where A is
non-vacuous (not all zeros). Then either:
Az ￿ 0
(a1) Cz ￿ 0
(a2) Dz = 0
(a3)
has a solution z 2 Rm, or:
b1A + b2C + b3D = 0
(m)
has a solution b1 > 0(a1), b2 ￿ 0(a2), and b3 sign unrestricted, but never both. A proof of
Motzkin￿ s Theorem can be found in Mangasarian [1969].
Proof of Part (a) of Proposition 1
For part (a) of Proposition 1, we have rMi = rM3 in the system of equations (3.6). If
there exist real numbers h￿1;￿2;￿3i ￿ 0(3), ￿4 > 0, and ￿5 ￿ 0 such that system (3.6) is
satis￿ed, then there must also exist real numbers under the same sign restrictions that
satisfy (3.6), but with ￿4 = 1. Thus, without loss of generality, we set ￿4 = 1. Also, if
￿5 = 0 the status quo tax system is already optimal. Therefore, we consider the case in


































0(x3) = ￿￿5 (A.9)
One can solve equations (A.4), (A.6), and (A.8) for ￿1, ￿2, and ￿3. Notice that
the solution obtained will be independent of ￿5. It then follows from equations (A.5),
(A.7), and (A.9), respectively, that x1 = x1, x2 = x2, and x3 > x3 (since ￿5 > 0 and
u(￿) is strictly concave). Using equation (3.1), this establishes that MTR1 = MTR1,
MTR2 = MTR2, and MTR3 < MTR3.
As the status quo equilibrium is assumed to be tight, one can solve equations (2:3)￿
(2:5) to obtain:
y1 =
w2(n2 + n3)[u(x1) ￿ u(x2)] + ￿
￿P
i nixi + G ￿
n3w3








i nixi + G ￿ n1y1 ￿
n3w3






[u(x3) ￿ u(x2)] + y2 (A.12)







= n3 [￿ ￿ w3u
0(x3)] (A.13)
From equations (A.8) and (A.9) it follows that ￿ ￿ w3u0(x3) > 0, which implies that
@y1(￿)=@x3 > 0. Using equation (2.4), @y1(￿)=@x3 > 0 implies that @y2(￿)=@x3 > 0. And
using equation (A.12), @y2(￿)=@x3 > 0 implies that @y3(￿)=@x3 > 0.
As all equilibrium-preserving and welfare-improving tax reforms require an increase
in the high-skill type￿ s marginal tax rate, the tax reform must include dx3 < 0. And
because x1 = x1 and x2 = x2, the tax reform also has dx1 = dx2 = 0. The comparative
statics results now imply that the tax reform must include dyj < 0 for all j. Finally,
16since the tax reform reduces tax payments by low-skill and middle-skill individuals, and
because the tax reform moves the tax system towards optimality, T1 > T 1, T2 > T 2, and
T3 < T 3 must hold in the initial equilibrium. ￿
Proofs of Parts (b) and (c) of Proposition 1, and Proof of Proposition 2
As the strategy for proving parts (b) and (c) of Proposition 1, and for proving all parts
of Proposition 2, is basically the same as that for proving part (a) of Proposition 1, we
omit these proofs. Details of these proofs are, however, available upon request. ￿
Proof of Part (a) of Proposition 3
For part (a) of Proposition 3, we have rTi = rT3 in the system of equations (4.4). If
there exist real numbers h￿1;￿2;￿3i ￿ 0(3), ￿4 > 0, and ￿5 ￿ 0 such that system (4.4) is
satis￿ed, then there must also exist real numbers under the same sign restrictions that
satisfy (4.4), but with ￿4 = 1. Thus, without loss of generality, we set ￿4 = 1. Also, if
￿5 = 0 the status quo tax system is already optimal. Therefore, we consider the case in


































0(x3) = ￿￿5 (A.19)

















































@￿5n1(n1 ￿ ￿2) +
@￿2
@￿5￿1n1
(n1 ￿ ￿2)2 (A.24)














As u(￿) is strictly concave, from equation (A.25) we obtain u0(x1) < u0(x1) =) x1 >
x1 =) MTR1 < MTR1.



















(￿2 ￿ ￿3 + n2)2 (A.27)
Using equations (A.20), (A.21), and (A.22), equation (A.27) simpli￿es to:
















As u(￿) is strictly concave, from equation (A.28) we obtain u0(x2) < u0(x2) =) x2 >
x2 =) MTR2 < MTR2.
Using equations (A.18) and (A.19), we obtain u0(x3) = ￿=w3. Therefore, u0(x3) =
u0(x3) =) x3 = x3 =) MTR3 = MTR3.
Finally, x1 > x1, x2 > x2, and x3 = x3 implies that a tax reform towards optimality
requires dx1 < 0, dx2 < 0, and dx3 = 0. Since dx3 = 0 and tax payments by high-skill
18individuals must be increased, the tax reform also requires dy3 > 0. This in turn implies
that aggregate tax payments by low-skill and middle-skill individuals must be reduced,
hence dy1 < 0 and/or dy2 < 0, and T1 + T2 > T 1 + T 2 and T3 < T 3 must hold in the
initial equilibrium. ￿
Proofs of Parts (b) and (c) of Proposition 3, and Proof of Proposition 4
As the strategy for proving parts (b) and (c) of Proposition 3, and for proving all parts
of Proposition 4, is basically the same as that for proving part (a) of Proposition 3, we
omit these proofs. Details of these proofs are, however, available upon request. ￿
7 Appendix B
In this appendix we provide numerical examples of our results. These present concrete
examples of suboptimal tax systems in which all feasible welfare-improving tax reforms
require the speci￿ed change in the particular agent￿ s tax treatment. They also provide
a useful check on the validity of each of our propositions. In the numerical examples, we
assume that u(xi) = ln(xi) and the size of the population is normalised to unity. The
model parameter values used in the examples are presented in Table A.
TABLE A
Model Parameter Values
α 1.00 0.25 1.00
G 2.25 0.50 2.00
0.25 3.00
1 n 1 w
2 n 2 w
3 n 3 w
Using these parameters, the values of the endogenous variables when the tax system
is optimal are presented in Table B, while the subsequent tables present examples of
suboptimal tax systems for each of our propositions. For Propositions 1 and 2 we
normalise ￿4 = 1, and we set ￿5 = 0:01. For Propositions 3 and 4 we normalise ￿4 = 1,
19and we set ￿5 = 0:01.
TABLE B
Optimal Tax System
0.82632 0.28571 0.71429 0.54060
4.49148 1.78571 0.10714 2.70577
6.04786 3.00000 0.00000 3.04786
Memo item: multipliers
0.58333 0.20833 0.18750
1 y 1 x 1 MTR 1 T
2 y 2 x 2 MTR 2 T
3 y 3 x 3 MTR 3 T
1 q 2 q 3 q
TABLE 1a
Part (a) of Proposition 1: Suboptimal Tax System
0.82826 0.28571 0.71429 0.54254
4.49342 1.78571 0.10714 2.70770
6.26291 3.22086 –0.07362 3.04205
Memo item: multipliers
0.58333 0.20833 0.18750
1 y 1 x 1 MTR 1 T
2 y 2 x 2 MTR 2 T
3 y 3 x 3 MTR 3 T
1 q 2 q 3 q
TABLE 1b
Part (b) of Proposition 1: Suboptimal Tax System
0.83185 0.28571 0.71429 0.54614
4.56679 1.84911 0.07544 2.71768
6.01851 3.00000 0.00000 3.01851
Memo item: multipliers
0.58333 0.20833 0.18750
1 y 1 x 1 MTR 1 T
2 y 2 x 2 MTR 2 T
3 y 3 x 3 MTR 3 T
1 q 2 q 3 q
20TABLE 1c
Part (c) of Proposition 1: Suboptimal Tax System
0.93813 0.30675 0.69325 0.63138
4.46122 1.78571 0.10714 2.67551
6.01760 3.00000 0.00000 3.01760
Memo item: multipliers
0.58333 0.20833 0.18750
1 y 1 x 1 MTR 1 T
2 y 2 x 2 MTR 2 T
3 y 3 x 3 MTR 3 T
1 q 2 q 3 q
TABLE 2a
Part (a) of Proposition 2: Suboptimal Tax System
0.82793 0.28571 0.71429 0.54222
4.49309 1.78571 0.10714 2.70738
5.85051 2.80749 0.06417 3.04302
Memo item: multipliers
0.58333 0.20833 0.18750
1 y 1 x 1 MTR 1 T
2 y 2 x 2 MTR 2 T
3 y 3 x 3 MTR 3 T
1 q 2 q 3 q
TABLE 2b
Part (b) of Proposition 2: Suboptimal Tax System
0.82200 0.28571 0.71429 0.53629
4.41974 1.72652 0.13674 2.69323
6.07726 3.00000 0.00000 3.07726
Memo item: multipliers
0.58333 0.20833 0.18750
1 y 1 x 1 MTR 1 T
2 y 2 x 2 MTR 2 T
3 y 3 x 3 MTR 3 T
1 q 2 q 3 q
21TABLE 2c
Part (c) of Proposition 2: Suboptimal Tax System
0.72225 0.26738 0.73262 0.45487
4.52006 1.78571 0.10714 2.73434
6.07644 3.00000 0.00000 3.07644
Memo item: multipliers
0.58333 0.20833 0.18750
1 y 1 x 1 MTR 1 T
2 y 2 x 2 MTR 2 T
3 y 3 x 3 MTR 3 T
1 q 2 q 3 q
TABLE 3a
Part (a) of Proposition 3: Suboptimal Tax System
0.98045 0.31461 0.68539 0.66584
4.48505 1.81461 0.09270 2.67044
5.99328 3.00000 0.00000 2.99328
Memo item: multipliers
0.59333 0.20333 0.16500
1 y 1 x 1 MTR 1 T
2 y 2 x 2 MTR 2 T
3 y 3 x 3 MTR 3 T
1 b 2 b 3 b
TABLE 3b
Part (b) of Proposition 3: Suboptimal Tax System
0.97706 0.31461 0.68539 0.66245
4.43556 1.77326 0.11337 2.66230
6.01294 3.00000 0.00000 3.01294
Memo item: multipliers
0.59333 0.20333 0.19500
1 y 1 x 1 MTR 1 T
2 y 2 x 2 MTR 2 T
3 y 3 x 3 MTR 3 T
1 b 2 b 3 b
22TABLE 3c
Part (c) of Proposition 3: Suboptimal Tax System
0.21247 0.19277 0.80723 0.01970
4.65921 1.78090 0.10955 2.87831
6.22369 3.00000 0.00000 3.22369
Memo item: multipliers
0.59333 0.22333 0.19500
1 y 1 x 1 MTR 1 T
2 y 2 x 2 MTR 2 T
3 y 3 x 3 MTR 3 T
1 b 2 b 3 b
TABLE 4a
Part (a) of Proposition 4: Suboptimal Tax System
0.65074 0.25581 0.74419 0.39493
4.50322 1.75581 0.12209 2.74741
6.11026 3.00000 0.00000 3.11026
Memo item: multipliers
0.57333 0.21333 0.21000
1 y 1 x 1 MTR 1 T
2 y 2 x 2 MTR 2 T
3 y 3 x 3 MTR 3 T
1 b 2 b 3 b
TABLE 4b
Part (b) of Proposition 4: Suboptimal Tax System
0.65401 0.25581 0.74419 0.39820
4.55369 1.79775 0.10112 2.75594
6.08992 3.00000 0.00000 3.08992
Memo item: multipliers
0.57333 0.21333 0.18000
1 y 1 x 1 MTR 1 T
2 y 2 x 2 MTR 2 T
3 y 3 x 3 MTR 3 T
1 b 2 b 3 b
23TABLE 4c
Part (c) of Proposition 4: Suboptimal Tax System
1.23368 0.36957 0.63043 0.86412
4.38975 1.79070 0.10465 2.59905
5.93777 3.00000 0.00000 2.93777
Memo item: multipliers
0.57333 0.19333 0.18000
1 y 1 x 1 MTR 1 T
2 y 2 x 2 MTR 2 T
3 y 3 x 3 MTR 3 T
1 b 2 b 3 b
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